Updated runs for various norms, added profit plots.

- L1
- L2
- asymmetric: differs on the sign of the asymmetry? Penalty only for decreasing quotas. Penalty only for increasing quotas. check implementation.
- fixed transaction fee – whoops, fixed cost should still be free when
`h == h_prev`

.

We need to determine a the magnitude of penalty coefficient to compare between the different functional forms. For instance, for what value of `c`

is an `L2`

penalty, $ c ( h_t - h_p )^2 $ comparable to the `L1`

penalty, $ c (h_t - h_p ) $ ?

I think we decided that we should select this parameter such that the penalty induces the same equilibrium expected profit from fishing (before costs of policy-changes are subtracted) in each functional form. Is this correct?

Consequently we simply calculate this expected-profit-from-fishing under each penalty over a range of `c`

values, and plot a curve for each profit value as a function of `c`

. A horizontal line across this graph at, say, 50% of the adjustment-costs-free (i.e. Reed) profits would intersect each curve at the value of `c`

that corresponded to this common baseline. Was that the agreed upon apples-to-apples strategy?